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This paper argues that the slow and incomplete deregulation of the
financial system in the 1980s was the most important factor behind
the Japanese banking troubles in the 1990s. The regression analysis
of Japanese banks shows that the cross-sectional variation of bad
loans ratios is best explained by the variation in the growth of loans
to the real estate industry. The variation of growth of real estate
lending, in turn, is explained by the varied experience of losing 
existing customers to capital markets. The rapid appreciation of land
prices in the late 1980s also fueled the growth of real estate lending.
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Keiretsu loansI. Introduction
In a year which was the worst-ever for many US and European banks, Japan’s
banks turned in higher profits, increased their capital and took a larger share of
world lending and capital-markets business. By the end of last year Japan had
almost caught up with the UK as the key centre for international lending. 
The Banker, July 1988, p. 109
This is what The Banker argued in 1988. The same issue ranked seven Japanese banks
among the top 10 banks in the world according to size of assets. Even when The
Banker changed the criterion and started ranking banks according to their tier-1 
capital in 1989, six Japanese banks remained in the top 10.
After 10 years, in 1998, Japanese banks had lost ground to their competitors in
the United States and Europe, and only three Japanese banks were ranked among the
top 10 (The Banker, July 1998). Even in the 1980s, there were some signs that cast
doubt on the continuing dominance of Japanese banks. For example, the article
quoted above ends with a cautious assessment that “with increasing competition 
at home and the rise in the yen possibly played out, Japan’s giants may start 1989 
carrying less fat than they do now” (The Banker, July 1988, p. 109). An article in the
July 1989 issue suggested “Japanese bankers may be seeing the end of a golden
decade” (The Banker, July 1989, p. 44). But, few would have expected that Japanese
banks would fall into such deep trouble. By 1998, Japan appeared to be “edging
towards a financial disaster of Titanic proportions” (The Banker, July 1998, p. 100).
Finally, the Japanese government came up with a framework to close down weak
banks and recapitalize solvent but undercapitalized banks in late 1998. The frame-
work was backed by ¥60 trillion of public funds. The newly created Financial
Reconstruction Commission (FRC) and the Financial Supervisory Agency imple-
mented the framework rather aggressively to resolve the banking problem in Japan
once and for all. They nationalized Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan and Nippon
Credit Bank in late 1998, moved much of their troubled loans to the Resolution and
Collection Corporation (RCC), and sold both banks to new investors. They injected
about ¥7.5 trillion of public funds into 15 large banks in March 1999. Then they
shifted the target for regional banks and used about ¥290 billion of public funds to
recapitalize five regional banks. They closed down five regional banks and put them
under receivers. One of them, Kokumin Bank, was cleaned up and sold to Yachiyo
Bank. At the end of the year 2000, the banking crisis in Japan seems to be finally
over, but Japanese banks still have to deal with the remaining bad loans and more
importantly focus their attention on being competitive in the post-deregulation
financial markets.
This paper asks how and why Japanese banks got into such trouble. It is not the
first paper to ask the question. Many researchers have already examined the banking
problem in Japan and by now we have a rough consensus on the factors that may
have been responsible for the problems. For example, Cargill (2000) identifies five
factors that eventually led Japanese banking into a crisis. First, the highly regulated
financial system, which worked well during the rapid economic growth period, failed
2 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/FEBRUARY 2001to adjust to the new environment that began to emerge in the 1970s. Second, the
Bank of Japan created too much liquidity in the late 1980s, with low interest rates,
and followed it by too abrupt a tightening of monetary policy. These policy failures
led to wild fluctuations in asset prices. Third, the government was slow in responding
to the problems in the financial system even after their existence was clear. Fourth,
Japanese taxpayers provided little support for the government to use public funds to
rescue the banking system. Finally, a lack of disclosure and transparency by banks and
other financial institutions and regulators contributed to the delay in the response to
the problems.
The first two factors are relevant to the question asked by this paper: why banks
got into trouble. The other three are explanations for why it took so long time for
them to get out of trouble. Of those two factors that initiated the problem, this paper
argues that the first, slow adjustment of the regulated financial system during the
1980s, was more important than the failure of monetary policy in explaining the 
crisis in Japanese banking. In this sense, the 1980s were not a “golden decade” for
Japanese banks. They were the start of the serious problem.
In focusing on the question of how the problems started, this paper’s attempt is
close to a paper by Ueda (2000). The emphasis given to the role of slow deregulation,
however, distinguishes this paper from that of Ueda. Ueda (2000) discusses both the
legacy of regulation and the land price bubble as factors that led to the problem, but
stresses the importance of land price fluctuations and criticizes the monetary policy
that caused such a large swing in asset prices. Using cross-sectional regression analysis
for 147 commercial banks, he shows that banks located in areas where land prices
increased rapidly and where their proportion of loans collateralized by real estate were
higher tended to have a higher proportion of real estate loans in their portfolios and
higher ratios of bad loans by the end of fiscal 1995 (March 31, 1996).
This paper also utilizes the cross-sectional variance of banking data to find out
which factors were important in creating the problems in Japanese banking. The
paper tries to expand and deepen the analysis of Ueda (2000) in a couple of aspects.
First, the paper uses more recent data on bad loans, which better reflect the true
extent of the banking problem. Second, panel structure of the data set is exploited
where possible.
The paper is organized in the following way. After briefly reviewing the bad-loan
problem at the height of the crisis in Chapter II, the paper develops a hypothesis of
why Japanese banks got into trouble, focusing on the role of slow and incomplete
financial deregulation in Chapter III. As the hypothesis is explained, some aggregate
data that are consistent overall with the story are also presented. Chapter IV examines
whether the story is consistent with the cross-sectional variation of bad-loan ratios.
Regression analyses similar to Ueda (2000) are carried out. Chapter IV finds that 
the cross-sectional variation of bad-loan ratios is closely associated with the propor-
tion of loans to the real estate industry. Thus, in Chapter V, the paper examines
which factors explain the shift of bank portfolios toward more real estate lending.
The paper finds that the loss of established customers as a result of incomplete finan-
cial deregulation led to the rapid growth of real estate lending. This was important
even after controlling the effects of wild swings in land prices.
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What Happened to Japanese Banks?II. The Bad-Loan Problem
It is not easy to grasp the extent of the bad-loan problem in Japanese banking. 
As Hoshi and Kashyap (1999) explain in detail, there are several different definitions
of bad loans, and moreover the definitions have changed over time. Currently, there
are three definitions of bad loans. Two sets of bad-loan figures are reported by 
individual banks on their balance sheets. “Risk management loans” include (1) loans
to failed enterprises; (2) loans whose payments have been suspended for three months
or more; and (3) restructured loans. The Japanese banks started publishing bad-loan
figures in 1993 (for fiscal 1992), but the definition included only loans to failed
enterprises.
1 The definition was expanded gradually over time, and the current 
definition is roughly comparable to the standard used by the U.S. Securities
Exchange Commission. The second set of figures consists of bad-loan figures that 
are required to be published under the Financial Reconstruction Act, which was one
of two laws passed in late 1998 to form the basis of the Japanese government’s efforts
to resolve the banking problem. The definition of bad loans according to this
requirement is slightly broader than that for risk management loans, but much 
narrower than the third definition of bad loans, which is used in bank examinations
by the Financial Services Agency (FSA).
2 Individual banks do not have to disclose 
the amount of bad loans according to this third definition, and the FSA only 
discloses the aggregate amounts for each type of bank (such as city banks, regional
banks, etc.).
Table 1 shows the amount of risk management loans as of March 1998 (end of
fiscal 1997), March 1999 (end of fiscal 1998), and March 2000 (end of fiscal 1999)
as well as cumulative write-offs from fiscal 1992 for Japanese banks. Since this is the
narrowest definition of bad loans, these figures probably understate the true extent of
the problem. Moreover, the figures exclude those banks that failed during a fiscal
year. Thus, the figures should be considered to give the lower bound of the extent of
the problem. As of March 2000, Japanese banks have over ¥30 trillion of bad loans,
which has remained even after having written off more than ¥28 trillion of loans in
the past seven years. If we add these figures together, assuming that none of the ¥30
trillion is recoverable, the total loss due to the banking problem is almost 12 percent
of GDP in fiscal 1999. This is an extreme assumption, but if we note that we are
looking at the narrowest definition of bad loans and that the figure excludes the bad
loans held by failed banks, a total loss of 12 percent of GDP seems plausible.
Table 2 shows the amount of risk management loans and cumulative write-offs
since 1992 for individual banks for March 1998. This is the data set used in the
regression analysis of bad loans described in Chapter IV. The data set includes 
the banks that failed in fiscal 1998 and 1999. Thus, the total amount of risk 
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1. City banks, long-term credit banks, and trust banks (together called major banks) reported loans whose payments
have been suspended for 6 months or more in addition to the loans to failed enterprises. See Ueda (2000, table 1)
for more details on how this definition of bad loans has changed over time.
2. The Financial Services Agency (FSA) was established in July 2000 to subsume the functions of the Financial
Supervisory Agency and the Ministry of Finance’s Financial System Planning Bureau. In January 2001, it also
took over the functions of the FRC, which was dissolved.management loans by banks in the data set are larger by ¥1.7 trillion than the figure
reported in Table 1. The total amount of cumulative write-offs, however, is much
smaller than the corresponding figure in Table 1, because the figures in Table 2
include only direct write-offs of loans and do not include loss on sales of loans and
other losses.
Table 2 also shows the figure for the outstanding amounts of special loan-loss
reserves, which was accumulated to prepare for losses from nonperforming loans.
The figures suggest that many banks have accumulated a substantial amount of
reserves, but the reserves were not sufficient to cover all the nonperforming loans.
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¥ billions
End of fiscal 1997 End of fiscal 1998 End of fiscal 1999
(March 1998) (March 1999) (March 2000)
Risk management loans 29,758 29,627 30,366
Cumulative write-offs 19,911 24,620 28,185
Total 49,669 54,247 58,551
(Proportion of GDP) (9.78%) (10.91%) (11.86%)
Note: Risk management loans consist of loans to borrowers in legal bankruptcy, past due loans, and
restructured loans. Write-offs include write-offs of loans, loss on sales of loans, loss on support
to other financial institutions. Before fiscal 1994, however, the write-offs only include write-offs 
of loans and loss on sales to the Cooperative Credit Purchase Corporation (CCPC). Hokkaido
Takushoku, Tokuyo City, Kyoto Kyoei, Naniwa, Fukutoku, and Midori Bank, which failed or
merged with other banks during fiscal 1997, are excluded. Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan,
Nippon Credit Bank, Kokumin, Kofuku, and Tokyo Sowa Bank, which were closed during fiscal
1998 or early fiscal 1999, are excluded from the figures for fiscal 1998 figures. Namihaya Bank
and Niigata Chuo Bank are excluded from the fiscal 1999 data.
Sources: Financial Supervisory Agency (1999), “The Status of Risk Management Loans Held by 
All Banks in Japan (as of the end of March, 1999),” and Financial Services Agency (2000), 
“The Status of Risk Management Loans Held by All Banks in Japan (as of the end of March,
2000),” from the FSA website (www.fsa.go.jp). The GDP figures are from the Economic 
Planning Agency website (www.epa.go.jp).
Table 1  Risk Management Loans and Cumulative Write-Offs
Table 2  Bad Loans, Cumulative Write-Offs, and Special Loan-Loss Reserves
Outstanding for Individual Banks (as of March 1998)
¥ millions
Risk Cumulative Bad-loan “Bad loans Special 
Code Bank management write-offs Total loans ratio plus write- loan-loss
loans since 1992 offs” ratio reserves
1 Dai-Ichi Kangyo 1,471,362  282,132  33,921,107  4.34% 5.17% 1,014,342
2 Sakura 1,475,401 53,037  34,328,583  4.30% 4.45% 929,928
3 Fuji 1,692,701 213,889  31,306,818  5.41% 6.09% 782,636
5 Tokyo–Mitsubishi 2,250,171 92,607  41,290,834  5.45% 5.67% 1,317,891
6 Asahi 994,617 106,491  20,460,087  4.86% 5.38% 613,647
8 Sanwa 1,287,580 110,704  32,895,295  3.91% 4.25% 774,460
9 Sumitomo 1,469,122 618,445  35,215,195  4.17% 5.93% 1,114,047
10 Daiwa 915,784 25,105  10,008,772  9.15% 9.40% 379,601
11 Tokai 1,221,628 86,148  19,795,525  6.17% 6.61% 714,257
12 Hokkaido Takushoku 2,343,353  134,105  5,857,834  40.00% 42.29% 1,675,537
116 Hokkaido  201,179  5,711  2,574,109  7.82% 8.04% 101,4646 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/FEBRUARY 2001
¥ millions
Risk Cumulative Bad-loan “Bad loans Special 
Code Bank management write-offs Total loans ratio plus write- loan-loss
loans since 1992 offs” ratio reserves
117 Aomori 38,347 2,426  1,370,122  2.80% 2.98% 17,583
118 Michinoku 52,955 1,149 1,221,205 4.34% 4.43% 29,717
119 Akita 33,668 1,751 1,301,434 2.59% 2.72% 20,934
120 Hokuto 28,126 3,519 877,364  3.21% 3.61% 19,246
121 Shonai 4,508 211 468,586  0.96% 1.01% 2,514
122 Yamagata 12,936 124  888,844  1.46% 1.47% 4,344
123 Iwate 13,367 229 1,069,674 1.25% 1.27% 3,862
124 Tohoku 9,506 347  427,663  2.22% 2.30% 5,404
125 77 74,881 2,418  3,013,457  2.48% 2.57% 27,042
126 Toho 64,982 1,302  1,688,533  3.85% 3.93% 25,549
128 Gumma 106,436 17,198  3,681,805  2.89% 3.36% 51,994
129 Ashikaga 445,861 196,586  4,367,019  10.21% 14.71% 167,342
130 Joyo 215,370 5,699  4,792,887  4.49% 4.61% 140,407
131 Kanto 69,998 6,140 689,975  10.15% 11.03% 30,245
133 Musashino 59,653 1,476  1,705,026  3.50% 3.59% 36,069
134 Chiba 181,273 102,691  5,652,141  3.21% 5.02% 87,151
135 Chiba Kogyo 134,601  10,746  1,579,193  8.52% 9.20% 50,259
137 Tokyo Tomin 117,967  29,907  1,745,966  6.76% 8.47% 57,485
138 Yokohama 396,366 21,729  7,876,489  5.03% 5.31% 234,608
140 Daishi 50,785 6,589  2,338,543  2.17% 2.45% 25,387
141 Hokuetsu 58,668 1,504  1,323,975  4.43% 4.54% 16,908
142 Yamanashi Chuo 34,035  625  1,275,417  2.67% 2.72% 23,025
143 Hachijuni 83,724 2,448  3,762,958  2.22% 2.29% 36,128
144 Hokuriku 392,519 57,009  4,632,940  8.47% 9.70% 207,010
145 Toyama 2,514 34  213,364  1.18% 1.19% 872
146 Hokkoku 75,478 767  1,876,254  4.02% 4.06% 27,878
147 Fukui 59,645 126  1,473,657  4.05% 4.06% 20,394
149 Shizuoka 134,439 1,463  4,799,499  2.80% 2.83% 39,617
150 Suruga 82,194 8,916  1,979,950  4.15% 4.60% 40,225
151 Shimizu 21,026 400  738,649  2.85% 2.90% 13,646
152 Ogaki Kyoritsu 40,453  1,475  1,968,316  2.06% 2.13% 25,892
153 Juroku 83,898 1,586  2,540,576  3.30% 3.36% 32,713
154 Mie 8,701 135  851,574  1.02% 1.04% 3,087
155 Hyakugo 47,514 424  1,944,197  2.44% 2.47% 24,795
157 Shiga 62,749 1,201  2,145,733  2.92% 2.98% 26,985
158 Kyoto 97,584 5,230  2,501,716  3.90% 4.11% 51,267
159 Osaka 95,779 5,004  1,231,855  7.78% 8.18% 50,434
160 Senshu 80,960 6,087  1,150,111  7.04% 7.57% 25,735
161 Ikeda 45,230 11,769  1,148,668  3.94% 4.96% 25,569
162 Nanto 69,831 19,262  2,438,877  2.86% 3.65% 47,029
163 Kiyo 131,435 8,104  1,884,140  6.98% 7.41% 77,941
164 Tajima 8,267 1,380 472,665  1.75% 2.04% 1,342
166 Tottori 7,662 488  493,441  1.55% 1.65% 4,923
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¥ millions
Risk Cumulative Bad-loan “Bad loans Special 
Code Bank management write-offs Total loans ratio plus write- loan-loss
loans since 1992 offs” ratio reserves
167 San-in Godo 55,353  2,450  2,117,434  2.61% 2.73% 39,147
168 Chugoku 50,448 7,982  2,901,381  1.74% 2.01% 17,482
169 Hiroshima 179,978 11,134  4,120,109  4.37% 4.64% 130,795
170 Yamaguchi 71,830 1,795  2,847,683  2.52% 2.59% 40,465
172 Awa 16,348 356  1,497,577  1.09% 1.12% 9,949
173 Hyakujushi 43,594 1,116  2,411,051  1.81% 1.85% 28,060
174 Iyo 83,188 5,506  2,419,816  3.44% 3.67% 48,273
175 Shikoku 45,572 500  1,681,028  2.71% 2.74% 18,326
177 Fukuoka 125,730 3,008  5,022,231  2.50% 2.56% 60,744
178 Chikuho 8,924 110  346,871  2.57% 2.60% 3,224
179 Saga 39,723  368  1,205,261  3.30% 3.33% 13,225
180 Eighteenth 28,709 3,198  1,542,015  1.86% 2.07% 13,534
181 Shinwa 55,654 2,805  1,260,804  4.41% 4.64% 35,577
182 Higo 24,501 5,635  1,719,871  1.42% 1.75% 9,344
183 Oita 17,574 4,773  1,441,256  1.22% 1.55% 8,667
184 Miyazaki 32,597  2,138  1,033,481  3.15% 3.36% 22,652
185 Kagoshima 27,082 933  1,637,153  1.65% 1.71% 20,125
187 Ryukyu 68,844 6,138 993,882  6.93% 7.54% 29,759
188 Okinawa 50,380 2,994 834,041  6.04% 6.40% 16,293
190 Nishi Nippon 124,036  2,701  3,515,467  3.53% 3.61% 34,309
287 Mitsui Trust 756,998  31,703  6,068,553  12.47% 13.00% 546,751
288 Mitsubishi Trust 692,020  138,658  9,362,583  7.39% 8.87% 489,487
289 Yasuda Trust 540,483  404,945  3,872,380  13.96% 24.41% 361,417
290 Toyo Trust 264,812  50,678  4,784,593  5.53% 6.59% 163,606
291 Chuo Trust 221,426  30,045  1,741,218  12.72% 14.44% 139,769
292 Nippon Trust 140,202  1,756  761,602  18.41% 18.64% 99,059
294 Sumitomo Trust 1,026,295  287,533  8,635,298  11.88% 15.21% 645,953
396 IBJ 1,569,426 726,899  23,082,030  6.80% 9.95% 793,366
397 LTCB 1,378,541 407,093  15,754,600  8.75% 11.33% 706,864
398 Nippon Credit 1,731,941  120,307  7,775,424  22.27% 23.82% 672,788
501 Hokuyo 75,375 6,366  1,602,660  4.70% 5.10% 26,961
502 Sapporo 37,376 2,840 611,189  6.12% 6.58% 16,879
507 Yamagata Shiawase 21,027  193  452,469  4.65% 4.69% 1,937
508 Shokusan 11,978 2,133 482,696  2.48% 2.92% 5,385
509 Kita Nippon 10,818  1,278  754,973  1.43% 1.60% 3,560
511 Tokuyo City 56,082  2,308  495,132  11.33% 11.79% 43,194
512 Sendai 15,220 777  363,427  4.19% 4.40% 7,472
513 Fukushima 41,960 1,674 580,566  7.23% 7.52% 20,900
514 Daito 21,163 301  519,824  4.07% 4.13% 7,722
516 Towa 84,464 2,198  1,185,690  7.12% 7.31% 37,817
517 Tochigi 65,135 2,403  1,239,258  5.26% 5.45% 24,745
519 Ibaragi 48,943 2,945 600,266  8.15% 8.64% 26,008
520 Tsukuba 23,881 1,172 250,389  9.54% 10.01% 7,993
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Risk Cumulative Bad-loan “Bad loans Special 
Code Bank management write-offs Total loans ratio plus write- loan-loss
loans since 1992 offs” ratio reserves
522 Keiyo 90,186 4,685 1,990,728 4.53% 4.77% 41,427
525 Higashi Nippon 79,254 1,916  1,217,448  6.51% 6.67% 32,948
526 Tokyo Sowa 149,492 14,323  1,857,481  8.05% 8.82% 62,371
528 Kokumin 81,867 4,073 451,492  18.13% 19.03% 37,168
530 Kanagawa 17,187 227  273,993  6.27% 6.36% 7,078
531 Niigata Chuo 75,380  4,547  930,628  8.10% 8.59% 24,143
532 Taiko 27,206 1,389 660,608  4.12% 4.33% 13,714
533 Nagano 15,611 164  550,646  2.84% 2.86% 5,060
534 First Bank of Toyama 27,002  209  610,282  4.42% 4.46% 8,052
535 Ishikawa 38,616 1,484 489,993  7.88% 8.18% 12,430
537 Fukuho 8,786 212  318,508  2.76% 2.83% 4,993
538 Shizuoka Chuo 2,280  140  272,995  0.84% 0.89% 1,256
539 Chubu 27,458 1,733 430,214  6.38% 6.79% 12,522
541 Gifu 28,736 648  557,324  5.16% 5.27% 16,273
542 Aichi 36,867 142  1,367,170  2.70% 2.71% 20,395
543 Nagoya 34,289 435  1,779,881  1.93% 1.95% 23,187
544 Chukyo 33,796 2,011  1,173,123  2.88% 3.05% 20,965
546 Daisan 42,686 3,180  1,181,522  3.61% 3.88% 20,903
547 Biwako 69,475 1,111 903,294  7.69% 7.81% 44,316
549 Kyoto Kyoei 59,196  3,667  262,727  22.53% 23.93% 51,861
550 Kinki 170,187 6,714  1,877,856  9.06% 9.42% 54,443
551 Naniwa 30,584 5,054 310,796  9.84% 11.47% 16,185
552 Kofuku 218,580 9,673  1,456,496  15.01% 15.67% 88,791
553 Fukutoku 149,871 13,593  1,170,325  12.81% 13.97% 66,217
554 Kansai 54,682 2,229 905,180  6.04% 6.29% 23,972
555 Taisho 13,415 580  219,016  6.13% 6.39% 7,352
557 Nara 5,521 717  108,208  5.10% 5.76% 1,665
558 Wakayama 16,113 1,370 326,612  4.93% 5.35% 7,018
562 Hanshin 58,859 3,571 896,886  6.56% 6.96% 29,565
565 Shimane 8,535 728  220,350  3.87% 4.20% 4,832
566 Tomato 31,130 415  511,894  6.08% 6.16% 6,483
568 Setouchi 36,416 2,067 606,263  6.01% 6.35% 9,873
569 Hiroshima Sogo 58,240  2,722  1,539,313  3.78% 3.96% 42,103
570 Saikyo 24,347 499  471,668  5.16% 5.27% 7,572
572 Tokushima 10,147 891  694,749  1.46% 1.59% 5,229
573 Kagawa 25,238 226  919,178  2.75% 2.77% 8,987
576 Ehime 28,045 3,291  1,089,369  2.57% 2.88% 9,949
578 Kochi 25,333 1,910 707,340  3.58% 3.85% 11,367
581 Fukuoka City 70,110  3,091  2,293,271  3.06% 3.19% 28,633
582 Fukuoka Chuo 7,888  516  230,888  3.42% 3.64% 2,191
583 Saga Kyoei 8,209  83  181,363  4.53% 4.57% 2,356
585 Nagasaki 20,441 219  247,466  8.26% 8.35% 7,610
586 Kyushu 62,361 5,404 862,141  7.23% 7.86% 33,113
Table 2  (Continued)III. Deregulation and Banking Crisis: A Hypothesis
Before analyzing the data in Table 2, this chapter provides a hypothesis which argues
that the slow adjustment of the heavily regulated financial system was the most
important factor behind the banking problem in Japan. Thus, the hypothesis stresses
the importance of the first factor in Cargill (2000) rather than the second factor: 
mistakes in monetary policy and bubbles. The story itself is not very original and
similar to some explanations of the Japanese banking problem put forward by various
researchers. The original part of this paper is found in the regression analysis in the
following chapters that offers corroborating evidence for the hypothesis.
During the period of rapid economic growth (roughly the early 1950s to the early
1970s), the Japanese financial system was characterized by heavy regulation.
Domestic capital markets, such as those for bond issues and new stock issues, were
repressed, but neither borrowers or lenders had the option of relying on foreign 
markets in a significant way. As a result, Japanese corporations had to get almost all
external financing from the banking sector. This encouraged Japanese firms to form
close relations with their banks and led to the creation of an arrangement called the
“main bank system.”
3 The main bank system had certain virtues, but it became rather
costly for some types of firms, as we will see below. The household sector did not
have much choice but to hold their financial assets in the form of bank deposits. The
heavy regulation included strict separation of business lines in the financial industry.
For example, banks were prohibited from conducting securities business or insurance
business. Securities houses were prohibited from taking deposits or selling insurance
products. Sometimes the regulation imposed finer separations. Life insurance com-
panies had to concentrate on providing life insurance policies only, while non-life
insurance companies provided homeowners’ insurance and auto insurance policies.
9
What Happened to Japanese Banks?
¥ millions
Risk Cumulative Bad-loan “Bad loans Special 
Code Bank management write-offs Total loans ratio plus write- loan-loss
loans since 1992 offs” ratio reserves
587 Kumamoto Family 75,834  3,015  1,066,982  7.11% 7.39% 33,304
590 Howa 11,374  1,009  364,368  3.12% 3.40% 3,212
591 Miyazaki Taiyo 12,017  321  348,557  3.45% 3.54% 3,885
594 Minami Nippon 19,438  1,732  510,000  3.81% 4.15% 7,919
596 Okinawa Kaiho 16,970  1,001  313,923  5.41% 5.72% 7,375
597 Yachiyo 100,036  6,851  1,324,942  7.55% 8.07% 48,838
Total 31,459,711 4,693,681 527,839,306 17,769,051
Note: Risk management loans consist of loans to borrowers in legal bankruptcy, past due loans, and restructured
loans. Write-offs include write-offs of loans only. Thus, the write-off figures are not comparable to those
reported in Table 1.
Sources: Zenginkyo (Japanese Bankers Association), Analysis of Financial Statements of All Banks, various issues.
Table 2  (Continued)
3. See Aoki and Patrick (1994) and Sheard (1997) for more on the main bank system.Banks were supposed to deal with rather large customers, while shinkin banks 
and credit unions had to focus on their member firms, all of which were small. The
strict separation of business lines forced Japanese banks to limit their business to the 
traditional banking business of taking deposits and making loans.
The situation started to change as the Japanese government began deregulating
the financial system, albeit gradually, in the late 1970s.
4 Financial deregulation
started with the creation of a secondary market for government bonds and gradually
spread to markets for corporate bonds and equities. Also important was the relax-
ation of foreign exchange controls in 1980 (reform of the Foreign Exchange and
Control Act) and in 1984 (abolishment of the “real demand principle”), which
opened the way for Japanese corporations to raise funds abroad. Gradually, large
Japanese firms obtained alternative financing options to bank borrowing. Many large
firms responded to the change by replacing their bank loans with new bond financ-
ing and reducing the dependence on banks. For example, Figure 1 shows the ratio of
bank loans to total assets for large manufacturing firms in Japan. The ratio was
around 0.35 in the 1970s, but started to decline in the 1980s. By 1990, it fell below
0.15. This exodus from bank borrowing shows that by the 1980s many large firms
had started to feel the cost of depending exclusively on banks.
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Although deregulation of the bond market happened only gradually, the deregu-
lation of saving options for households was even slower. U.S. mutual fund-type 
investment products became available only in December 1998. Investment trusts,












Figure 1  Ratio of Bank Debt to Total Assets: Large Manufacturing Firms
Note: The figure shows the (weighted) average ratio of total bank loans to total assets
for large manufacturing firms in Japan for the most recent accounting year
ended in the last 12 months. Large firms are defined here as listed firms with
total assets of more than ¥120 billion in 1990 prices.
Source: Author’s calculations using the Japan Development Bank Database.
4. See Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1993), Hoshi (1996), and Hoshi and Kashyap (1999, 2001) for more
detailed discussion on financial deregulation and the reactions of Japanese corporations.which were closest to such products, had poor track records and did not offer a 
serious alternative to bank deposits. Almost all the investment trust companies were
subsidiaries of securities houses, and they were often interested in churning all the
accounts they managed to collect high commission fees for their parents. Most of 
the time, investment trusts underperformed the market indices by large margins.
5
Figure 2 shows the amount of deposits by individuals at city banks. The figure 
suggests that deposits kept flowing into the banking sector.
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Figure 2  Individual Deposits at City Banks (Ratio to GDP)
Sources: Bank of Japan, Economic Statistical Annual, various issues.
The deregulation of separation of business lines in the financial industry was also
slow. Only in 1993 were banks allowed to set up securities subsidiaries (and securities
firms were allowed to set up trust bank subsidiaries). Even then, the Ministry of
Finance only gradually approved the actual establishment of securities subsidiaries,
and it was not until late 1995 that all the major city banks were allowed to establish
them.
6 Moreover, the business of bank-owned securities subsidiaries was still limited
to underwriting and related business.
Theoretically, foreign subsidiaries of Japanese banks did not face the restriction 
on entering securities business that their parents faced. Such a loophole, however, 
was quickly closed by the Ministry of Finance in the form of the “three bureaus
agreement,” which stated that the banks should “pay due respect to the experience
gained by and the mandate given to the Japanese securities firms.” This agreement
was interpreted as preventing bank-owned subsidiaries from becoming the leading
underwriters of bond issues by Japanese corporations (Rosenbluth [1989], p. 152).
5. See Cai, Chan, and Yamada (1997), for example.
6. See Hamao and Hoshi (2000) for more details.As a result of the continuing regulation of the scope of banking business in the
1980s, Japanese banks were forced to stay in the traditional banking business of taking
deposits and making loans. As large customers moved away from bank financing,
many banks started to fill the gap by lending to new and often small customers.
Several figures show such a shift of the customer base for Japanese banks. Figure 3
shows the proportion of bank loans to small and medium firms. Small and medium
firms are defined here as those firms that have less than ¥100 million in equity or less
than 300 regular employees. The figure shows that Japanese banks increased loans to
small and medium-sized firms as they lost their large customers to the capital 
markets. Those large customers were mostly established firms that belonged to one of
the major keiretsu, a group of large firms centered on major financial institutions.
7
Figure 4 shows the proportion of bank loans to those firms belonging to the major
keiretsu (solid line), illustrating the steady decline of the keiretsu loan ratio. Since
most listed firms in Japan belong to one keiretsu or another, the proportion of bank
loans to listed firms shows a similar downward trend (broken line in Figure 4). Thus,
Japanese banks started to rely more on loans to small, non-listed firms.
A problem was that the banks did not have intimate knowledge of these new 
customers. Presumably to compensate for the lack of information, the banks 
often required collateral for those loans. What was considered most secure for such
12 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/FEBRUARY 2001
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Figure 3  Proportion of Bank Loans to Small and Medium Firms
Note: Small and medium firms are defined here as firms other than “large” firms
according to the definition from the Bank of Japan. The Bank of Japan defines
large firms as those firms with more than ¥100 million in equity and more than
300 regular employees.
Sources: Bank of Japan, Financial and Economic Statistical Monthly, various years.collateral was land, whose nominal value did not fall even once throughout the 
postwar period, until the 1990s. Figure 5 shows the proportion of bank loans secured
by land, which surprisingly declined in the early 1980s but grew rapidly during the
late 1980s. For the banks that shifted toward collateralized lending, corporations in
the real estate business and construction business looked especially promising, having
land that started to increase in value especially rapidly in the late 1980s. Sometimes,
13
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Figure 4  Keiretsu Loans and Loans to Listed Firms
Sources: Keizai Chosakai, Kin’yu Kikan no Tôyushi (Investment and Loans by
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(March-end)
Figure 5  Proportion of Loans Collateralized by Land
Source: Author’s calculations using the Nikkei Database.loans to real estate developers were not initiated directly by banks but through non-
bank subsidiaries, such as leasing companies, of banks. Figures 6 through 8 show the
proportion of loans to these three industries (real estate, construction, and non-bank
financial institutions). Figures 6 and 8 show the rapid increase of bank loans to real
estate firms and non-banks during the 1980s. Figure 7 suggests, however, that the
proportion of loans to the construction industry was rather flat. Contrary to the
impression of many observers, Japanese banks as a whole did not really increase their
exposure to the construction industry.
When land prices collapsed in the early 1990s, many loans to those industries
became nonperforming and the collateral lost its value. This led to the bad-loan
problem of Japanese banks.
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Figure 6  Proportion of Loans to the Real Estate Industry
Source: Author’s calculations using the Nikkei Database.










Figure 7  Proportion of Loans to the Construction Industry
Source: Author’s calculations using the Nikkei Database.When Japanese banks lost their large customers to the capital markets, increasing
the loans to new customers was not the only choice they had. For example, they
could have increased their holding of government bonds. During the 1980s, however,
the Japanese government was in the middle of “administrative reform” to limit the
growth of government expenditures and eliminate the budget deficit. Figure 9 shows
the proportion of government bonds in the assets of Japanese banks. The ratio shot
up in the late 1970s, reflecting increasing use of deficit financing. The ratio, however,
declined quickly in the 1980s, reflecting the government’s efforts to reduce the debt.
Shifting from corporate loans to government bonds was not a viable option for
Japanese banks in the 1980s.
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Figure 8  Proportion of Loans to Non-Bank Financial Institutions
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Figure 9  Proportion of Government Bonds to Total Assets
Source: Author’s calculations using the Nikkei Database.It is worth pointing out that this hypothesis does not argue that the collapse of
the bubble was unimportant. It was an important event that triggered the bad-loan
problem. The land price bubble alone, however, cannot explain the emergence of the
problem in the Japanese banking sector. Figure 10 shows land price inflation in Japan
from 1956 to 1997, indicating that the bubble in the late 1980s was not the first in
the postwar period, nor even the largest. Banks’ behavior and performance were not
greatly influenced by land price fluctuations in the earlier episodes. The hypothesis
developed in this chapter argues that the banks’ response to slow and incomplete
financial deregulation made them vulnerable to the movement of land prices. The
hypothesis finds the fundamental problem in “over-banking,” which emerged when
corporations shifted to capital market financing but options for savers and banks
were extremely slow to be expanded.
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IV. Real Estate Loans and Bad Loans
If the shift of bank portfolio toward new customers in the real estate, construction, 
and non-bank financial industries set the stage for the bad-loan problem, one would
expect to find that the banks which shifted more aggressively toward those industries
ended up with larger amounts of bad loans. This chapter examines this implication of
the hypothesis developed in the last chapter, taking advantage of the cross-sectional 
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Figure 10  Land Price Inflation: 1956–97
Note: The solid line shows the real inflation rate of the average land price index for 
all uses in all areas, while the broken line shows the real inflation rate of the
average land price index for all uses in the six largest cities (Tokyo, Yokohama,
Nagoya, Kyoto, Osaka, and Kobe). The series is biannual. Land price indices
are divided by GDP deflator to make them real, then the inflation rate is 
calculated as the log difference from two periods (one year) before.
Sources: Bank of Japan, Economic Statistical Annual, various issues.A direct test of the implication would be to look at the composition of bad loans
by industry. We would expect to find the majority of bad loans in those industries.
Unfortunately, decomposition of bad loans by industry is not available for many
banks. Only a small number of banks started publishing such information in their
financial reports starting in March 1999. Table 3 shows the proportion of risk 
management loans for four city banks in Japan as of March 1999. In all four banks,
40 to 45 percent of bad loans are concentrated in the real estate, construction, and 
financial industries. Among those three, the loans to the real estate industry are the
most important for all banks, and for three out of four banks listed here, the real
estate industry has the largest concentration of bad loans among the seven industrial 
categories in the table.
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Sanwa Sumitomo Dai-Ichi Tokyo
Kangyo Mitsubishi
Real estate 21.59% 39.51% 15.76% 31.59%
Construction 4.62% 3.13% 12.26% 6.90%
Financial institutions 15.97% 5.72% 15.66% 7.83%
Manufacturing 13.75% 3.64% 7.69% 8.27%
Services 17.84% 36.55% 21.43% 16.99%
Wholesale and retail 14.14% 6.92% 12.39% 22.15%
Individuals and other Industries 12.09% 4.54% 14.81% 6.27%
Note: The figures for Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi are from the consolidated report, but include only the
loans to failed enterprises.
Sources: Tanshin report of each bank.
Table 3  Proportion of Risk Management Loans by Industry (March 1999)
For many banks, such a breakdown of bad loans by industry is not available.
Thus, we cannot see directly if the loans to the real estate, construction, and financial
industries constituted a substantial portion of bad loans. All we can establish is an
indirect link through correlation. Since every bank publishes an industrial distribu-
tion of total loans, we can examine if the banks that shifted their loan portfolios
more quickly toward particular industries ended up having more bad loans. This is
what the paper does in this chapter through a regression analysis.
The dependent variable of the regression is the ratio of bad loans and cumulative
write-offs to total loans outstanding. This is the figure reported in the next-to-last 
column of Table 2. The data are collected from Analysis of Financial Statements of All
Banks published by Zenginkyo (Japanese Bankers Association). This variable is
regressed on the changes in proportions of loans to the industries to see how the amount
of bad loans is correlated with the shift of bank portfolio in the late 1980s. The shift of
bank portfolio is measured by the changes in the proportions of loans to particular
industries from fiscal 1982 (which ended in March 1983) to fiscal 1989 (which ended
in March 1990).
8 The data for the distribution of loans across different industries are
obtained from financial data for the banking sector in the Nikkei Database.
8. The results reported below are robust to small changes in the timing of measuring the portfolio shift. The 
results are also robust to exclusion of some large values of bad-loan ratios that we find in Table 2 (e.g., more than
40 percent for Hokkaido Takushoku).Another implication of the hypothesis developed in the last chapter is that the
growth of bad loans is related to the growth of loans with land as collateral during the
late 1980s. To examine this link, the bad-loan ratio (including write-offs) is regressed
on the growth of land-collateralized loans. The data on loans with land as collateral
are also taken from the Nikkei Database.
Table 4 shows the result of the estimation. The sample includes 145 banks 
(10 city banks, 3 long-term credit banks, 7 trust banks, 64 regional banks, and 61
second-tier regional banks).
9 Each column represents a different specification. Model
1 tries to explain the amount of bad loans in 1998 by the growth of the proportion
of loans to real estate developers from 1983 to 1990. Model 2 similarly examines the
relation between the amount of bad loans and the growth of loans to the construc-
tion industry. Model 3 focuses on the relation to the growth of loans to non-bank
financial institutions. Model 4 uses the growth of loans collateralized by land as an
explanatory variable for the amount of bad loans. Finally, Model 5 includes both the
growths of loans to the real estate industry and the loans collateralized by land.
In every specification, four dummy variables to identify the type of bank are
included in addition to the constant term. LTCB takes one if the bank is a long-term
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9. Table 2 has information on 146 banks. We lose one bank in the regression analysis because the information on
loan portfolio for the 1980s at Yachiyo Bank, which was converted from a shinkin bank to a second-tier regional
bank in 1991, is not available in the database.
Table 4  Bad Loans (as of March 1998) and Shift in Bank Portfolios: OLS Estimation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Constant .060 .098 .098 .088 .060
(1.58) (2.69) (2.73) (2.60) (1.59)
LTCB .031 .050 .074 .075 .040
(0.54) (1.15) (1.45) (1.60) (0.74)
TRST .057 .048 .067 .066 .063
(1.34) (1.15) (1.65) (1.67) (1.55)
REG1 –.039 –.058 –.053 –.048 –.038
(–1.05) (–1.59) (–1.50) (–1.42) (–1.04)
REG2 –.021 –.033 –.035 –.026 –.020
(–0.57) (–0.92) (–0.96) (–0.75) (–0.54)






Land collateral .132 .050
(2.57) (1.08)
Adjusted .369 .252 .255 .282 .368 R-squared
Number of  145 145 145 145 145 observations
Note: The figures in parentheses are t-statistics. Heteroskedasticity consistent estimates of standard
errors by White (1980) are used to calculate the t-statistics.credit bank and takes zero otherwise. TRST, REG1, and REG2 are similarly defined
dummy variables for trust banks, regional banks, and second-tier regional banks,
respectively. The coefficient on a dummy variable shows the difference between the
average amount of bad loans for a particular category of banks and those for city
banks (all dummy variables are zero for a city bank).
To get consistent estimates for standard errors of the coefficient even when the
disturbances exhibit heteroskedasticity, I calculate the robust standard errors devel-
oped by White (1980). The standard tests of homoskedasticity suggested by White
(1980) reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity in all the models except for
Model 3, where the hypothesis of homoskedasticity is rejected only at an 8 percent
significance level. Thus, controlling for heteroskedasticity is important in examining
the statistical significance of our regression results. If we knew the source of 
heteroskedasticity, we could use more efficient estimators than OLS estimators. For
example, if the variance of the disturbance term were known to be proportional to
the amount of total assets of the bank, then a weighted least squares with total assets
would give us the efficient estimator. Unfortunately, we do not know exactly the
source of heteroskedasticity in our sample. Thus, I use the OLS estimator, which 
is not the most efficient one but is consistent. As we will see below, we find many
interesting and statistical significant results in spite of the possible loss of efficiency.
The table clearly shows that the amount of bad loans and the cumulative loss
from write-offs is highly correlated with the shift toward lending to real estate 
developers and collateralized lending. The correlation between bad loans and real
estate lending is especially high, and when both real estate lending and collateralized
lending are included in the regression, the coefficient on collateralized lending loses
its statistical significance. The correlation between bad loans and loans to the 
construction industry or non-banks is not statistically significant.
10
One potential problem of the regressions in Table 4 is simultaneity. A shift in bank
portfolios is a result of a decision at a bank. Thus, it is possible that a bank decision
that eventually led to the accumulation of bad loans also increased the exposure to the
real estate industry even though there is no direct link between the real estate lending
and bad loans. To mitigate such a simultaneity problem, the regressions in Table 4
regress bad loans in 1998 to the shift in bank portfolio that happened about 10 years
ago, but this may not be perfect. To further mitigate the problem of simultaneity, we
use the proportions of loans to the three industries and the proportion of collateralized
loans as of 1982, which is very early in the deregulation process, as instruments in the
regression analysis. Thus, the variable is not likely to have a high correlation with the
decision of the banks during the bubble period. Yet the variable should be correlated
with the shift in the bank portfolio in the 1980s. One drawback of this approach is that
we do not have information on the loans to real estate, construction, and non-bank
financial institutions as of 1982 for two long-term credit banks (Industrial Bank of
Japan and Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan). This reduces the number of long-term
credit banks in the sample to only one. Thus, the number of observations in the 
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10. To check the possibility of nonlinear relations, a square-term(s) of the loan variable(s) was added to each 
specification. None of them was found to be statistically significant.instrumental variable regressions drops to 143.
11 Since a dummy variable for long-term
credit banks is included in the regression, it is the equivalent of excluding all the 
long-term credit banks from the sample.
Table 5 shows the results of the instrumental variable estimation. The change in
the proportion of loans to real estate developers again appears to be most closely 
correlated with the amount of bad loans. Thus, the result here reinforces the result
obtained in the regressions in Table 4. The land-collateralized loan is not statistically
significant even when it is included in the regression alone (with the dummy 
variables). Interestingly, the changes in the loans to the construction and financial
industries become statistically significant in this instrumental variable estimation, but
the coefficient on non-bank loans has the sign opposite to what one would expect.
In summary, we find that the amount of bad loans is closely related to the shift
into real estate lending in the 1980s. Instead of using the bad-loan data for March
1998, we can use the data for March 1997. One advantage of using 1997 data is that
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Table 5  Bad Loans (as of March 1998) and Shift in Bank Portfolios: Two-Stage Least
Squares Estimation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Constant .020 .109 .115 .084 .021
(0.50) (3.19) (3.04) (2.31) (0.51)
LTCB .125 .137 .204 .161 .116
(3.34) (4.00) (4.81) (4.20) (2.77)
TRST .066 .042 .165 .074 .055
(1.46) (1.03) (2.56) (1.60) (1.11)
REG1 –.020 –.071 –.041 –.045 –.023
(–0.53) (–2.07) (–1.14) (–1.22) (–0.59)
REG2 –.008 –.037 –.048 –.022 –.012
(–0.22) (–1.08) (–1.29) (–0.61) (–0.29)






Land collateral .197 –.093
(1.41) (–0.89)
Adjusted .261 .219 .076 .287 .232 R-squared
Number of  143 143 143 143 143 observations
Note: The proportions of loans to real estate, construction, and financial industries, and the proportion
of loans collateralized by land as of March 1982, in addition to the constant and the dummy 
variables, are used as the instruments in the two-stage least squares estimation. The figures in
parentheses are t-statistics. Heteroskedasticity-consistent estimates of standard errors by White
(1980) are used to calculate the t-statistics.
11. I replicated the regression estimation in Table 4 using only the 143 observations. The results did not change in
any significant way. Growth of the loans to real estate developers and the loans collateralized with land are posi-
tively related with the bad-loan ratio. No significant relation between the growth of loans to the construction
industry or non-bank financial institutions and the bad-loan ratio is found. When we include both the growth of
real estate lending and land-collateralized loans at the same time (Model 5), only the real estate loan variable
comes in significantly.they do not include an extreme value such as the one for Hokkaido Takushoku Bank
in March 1998. When the regressions for Tables 4 and 5 are replicated using the 
bad-loan data for 1997, we get the same qualitative result. The growth of loans to 
the real estate industry is most closely correlated with the amount of bad loans.
Thus, the result in this chapter confirms an important part of the hypothesis
developed in the previous chapter. The shift of bank portfolio, especially into the real
estate industry, led to the bad loans. The story also explains why such a shift took
place. The plausibility of that part of the hypothesis is examined in the next chapter.
V. Slow Deregulation and Growth of Real Estate Loans
According to the hypothesis developed in Chapter III, the reason for the shift in 
bank portfolios toward more real estate lending is found in the slow and incomplete
deregulation. Corporate financing options for large firms were expanded, though 
gradually, and many firms reduced the dependence on bank loans. On the liability
(deposits) side, however, the banks continued to be dominant in the Japanese financial
system, because the deregulation to expand the savers’ options was even slower than the
deregulation of corporate finance. The deregulation of separation of business lines in
the financial industry was also slow, which severely limited the banks’ ability to move
beyond the traditional banking business. Thus, when the banks started to lose their
customers to the capital markets, many of them increased exposures to real estate
developers. Holding more government bonds instead was not really an option, because
the Japanese government was aggressively reducing the budget deficit.
This story suggests several variables that would explain the shift of bank portfolios
toward the real estate industry. This chapter considers five such factors and examines
how closely they are correlated with the growth of loans to the real estate industry.
First, two measures of the loss of existing customers are considered. According to the
hypothesis, the financial deregulation allowed established firms, which previously
relied on banks, to reduce their bank dependence. Thus, these two measures look at
changes in the bank’s loans to those established firms. The first measure defines the
established firms as those belonging to major keiretsu. The average of this measure for
all banks was plotted as the solid line in Figure 4. The second measure defines the
established firms as all listed firms, which covers not only keiretsu firms but also 
independent firms. The average for this measure was plotted as the broken line in
Figure 4. Since there are not many independent listed firms in Japan (see Nakatani
[1984], for example), the first measure (keiretsu loans) and the second measure (loans
to listed firms) show similar movements both over time and across banks.
The third measure is the change in the loans to small firms. As we saw in Figure 3,
many banks found new customers in small firms. This shift toward loans to small firms
is expected to have been related to the shift toward real estate loans.
The fourth measure is the change in the proportion of government bonds in bank
assets. As we discussed in Chapter III, Japanese banks could not increase their 
government bondholdings substantially when they lost their large customers to 
capital markets, because the Japanese government was in the process of reducing its
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their government bondholdings had less need to increase their exposure to the real
estate industry.
Instead of holding government bonds, the banks could have increased foreign
loans or asset holdings to stay away from loans to the real estate industry.
12 The fifth
measure tries to capture this relation. Unfortunately, the data set does not contain 
a series that shows the amount of foreign loans or foreign investments made by 
each bank. As a proxy, I calculate the proportion of bank branches located overseas
for each bank each year. Banks that increased the proportion of overseas branches
more rapidly are expected to have had less urgency to find customers in the real 
estate industry.
In the regressions, we take the change in the proportion of loans to real estate
developers as the dependent variables. The most important independent variable is
the five measures discussed above. Note that all the factors are measured as change in
the ratios. For example, the dependent variable that measure the loss of keiretsu loans
is calculated as the change in proportion of keiretsu loans in the total loans. To allow
for the response of real estate loans with some lags, four lags of a factor are included
in each regression. 
The sample period of the regressions is from fiscal 1983 (which ended in March
1984) to fiscal 1989 (which ended in March 1990), corresponding to the period of
rapid shift of bank portfolio toward the real estate industry. The number of banks in
the sample is 150, which is slightly larger than that for bad-loan regressions, because
it includes some banks that existed in 1990 but had failed or merged by 1998. The
sample includes 11 city banks, 3 long-term credit banks, 7 trust banks, 64 regional
banks, and 65 second-tier regional banks (called sogo banks before 1989).
To control for the individual effects, 150 bank dummies are included in each
regression, although the coefficient estimates are not reported in the tables.
13 By
including the individual effects in estimation, we can also control for some 
simultaneity problems as long as the problems are caused by bank-specific factors
(such as a managerial bias toward more real estate lending).
Four different sets of specifications are considered, which differ in how the 
aggregate (time-specific) factors are controlled. The first set of specifications just
includes six year dummy variables. The coefficient on a year dummy captures any
factors that influenced the real estate lending of all banks in the same way in a 
specific year. The second set of specifications includes the lags of aggregate land price
inflation instead of year dummies. This allows us to examine the importance of land
price inflation in fueling the growth of real estate loans, which is a part of standard
“bubble” explanation. The average price index for all uses in the six largest cities
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12. I thank the referee for the suggestion.
13. An alternative estimation strategy is to use random effect estimation. If the bank-specific part of the disturbance is
independent and identically distributed across firms and is uncorrelated with any explanatory variables in the
regression, the random effect estimation gives us the efficient estimator. If the bank-specific part is correlated with
some explanatory variables, however, the random effect estimators will be inconsistent. The estimation with bank
dummies gives us consistent estimates even when there is a correlation between the bank-specific disturbance and
explanatory variables. We may be losing some efficiency but use more robust estimation. See, for example, Judge
et al. ([1985], pp. 527–529) for a discussion on the choice between random effect versus fixed effect.(Tokyo, Yokohama, Nagoya, Kyoto, Osaka, and Kobe), published by the Real Estate
Research Institute, is used to construct the inflation series.
14 The price index is 
first divided by the GDP deflator to convert it to a real (rather than nominal) price.
The third set of specifications includes land price inflation calculated from the 
average land price for the prefecture where the bank’s headquarters are located. 
The prefecture-level land price is obtained from the Prefecture Land Price Survey
conducted in July each year. Thus, in the third set of specifications, land inflation 
has not only time-series but also cross-sectional variations. Ueda (2000) found pre-
fecture land price inflation to be one of the most important determinants of real
estate loans and bad loans. Finally, the fourth set of specifications includes both 
prefecture-specific land price inflation and six year dummies.
Table 6 shows the regression results for the specifications with six year dummies.
A dummy variable is assigned for each year except 1990. Thus, the coefficient on a
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14. An earlier version of the paper used the price index for all uses in all areas in Japan, and failed to find the positive
influence of land inflation on the growth of loans to the real estate industry. I thank the referee for suggesting the
use of the price index for the six largest cities.
Table 6  Regression Analysis of Real Estate Lending (1): Year Dummies
Independent Keiretsu Loans to Loans to Government Overseas
variable loans listed firms small firms bond ratio branch ratio
1984 dummy –.0034 –.0035 –.0029 –.0037 –0.0031
(–3.49) (–3.55) (–2.90) (–3.46) (–3.02)
1985 dummy –.0032 –.0033 –.0027 –.0031 –.0028
(–2.91) (–2.97) (–2.50) (–2.67) (–2.64)
1986 dummy .0004 .0003 .0014 .0010 .0014
(0.36) (0.24) (1.21) (0.78) (1.16)
1987 dummy .0029 .0028 .0037 .0032 .0038
(2.47) (2.40) (3.07) (2.56) (3.14)
1988 dummy –.0005 –.0006 –.0002 –.0006 –.0001
(–0.44) (–0.55) (–0.17) (–0.54) (–0.06)
1989 dummy .0004 .0003 .0005 .0001 .0005
(0.29) (0.27) (0.42) (0.08) (0.42)
Lag 1 of the  –.0183 –.0145 –.0038 –.0219 .2727
variable (–2.05) (–1.73) (–0.59) (–0.48) (1.33)
Lag 2 of the  –.0563 –.0506 –.0072 –.0134 –.2009
variable (–5.15) (–5.04) (–1.60) (–0.25) (–1.94)
Lag 3 of the  –.0512 –.0500 –.0061 –.0515 –.0335
variable (–4.05) (–4.59) (–1.52) (–1.17) (–0.27)
Lag 4 of the  –.0406 –0.0408 –.0098 –.0405 –.3463
variable (–3.16) (–3.84) (–2.36) (–1.18) (–1.73)
R-squared .254 .256 .233 .230 .251
Number of  1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 observations
Note: The dependent variable is the change in the proportion of loans to real estate industry from the
previous year. All the specifications include six year dummy variables as independent variables.
Each column differs in the main independent variable, which is specified in the first row of each
column. The main independent variables are also measured as changes from the previous 
year. Each regression includes dummy variables for banks to eliminate the fixed effects. 
The coefficients on dummy variables are not reported. The figures in parentheses are 
t-statistics. Heteroskedasticity-consistent estimates of standard errors by White (1980) 
are used to calculate the t-statistics.year dummy suggests how much that year differed from 1990 in terms of the growth
of real estate lending. The coefficient estimates on year dummies suggest that the
growth of real estate loans was slower for 1984 and 1985, implying that the rate of
growth picked up especially in the late 1980s. The year 1987 was a particularly
strong year for the growth of loans to the real estate industry.
The first specification using keiretsu loans shows that loss of keiretsu loans in fact
led to the growth of real estate loans. The effect of the first lag is somewhat smaller
than the effects of higher orders of lags, suggesting some time lags between the loss of
keiretsu firms and the increase of real estate lending. A similar result is obtained for
the specification using loans to listed firms. A decline in loans to listed firms leads to
an increase in real estate loans, perhaps with a time lag of two or more years.
The third specification examines the effect of the growth of loans to small 
firms. We would expect positive coefficients on the changes in loans to small firms,
but all the coefficient estimates are negative, suggesting that an increase in loans to
small firms leads to a fall in real estate lending. The result is not consistent with the
story developed in Chapter III, although one could interpret the result as showing
that those banks that were successful in finding small firms did not have to move so
much into real estate lending. The coefficient estimates, however, are not statistically
significant except for the one on the fourth lag.
15
The fourth specification uses the proportion of government bonds to total assets 
of a bank as the major explanatory variable. The coefficient estimates are all negative,
suggesting that the banks that were successful in increasing their government 
bondholdings saw lower growth of loans to the real estate industry. Thus, the result is
consistent with the hypothesis that the effort of the Japanese government to reduce 
its debt contributed to the shift of bank portfolios toward real estate lending. The 
coefficient estimates, however, are not statistically significant.
The final specification examines the relation between the growth of overseas
branches and the growth of real estate loans. The coefficients on the first and fourth
lags are positive, but those on the second and the third lags are negative. The sum of
the coefficients is positive, suggesting that high growth of overseas branches was 
associated with high growth of loans to the real estate industry. Combined with the
result for government bondholdings, this result seems to suggest the existence of two
types of banks: one type increased its government bondholdings and the other
increased both real estate lending and foreign investment. The statistical significance
of the coefficients, however, is marginal at best.
Table 7 reports the regression results with aggregate land price inflation. The
results for keiretsu loans, loans to listed firms, loans to small firms, the government
bond ratio, and the overseas branch ratio are very much the same as those in Table 6.
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15. Closer examination of this specification reveals that the significantly negative correlation between some lagged
increases in loans to small firms and the growth of loans to the real estate industry is driven by the observations
for long-term credit banks and trust banks. For regional and second-tier regional banks, the coefficients on the
changes in the loans to small firms are insignificantly different from zero. For city banks, in the specification that
uses the aggregate land inflation (the specification in Table 7), the third lag of the change in the loans to small
firms comes in significantly with a positive sign, but the coefficients in other cases are all insignificant. Thus, the
failure of finding small customers seems to have been an important driving force toward more real estate lending
for long-term credit and trust banks, but not for other banks.25
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Table 7  Regression Analysis of Real Estate Lending (2): Aggregate Land Price Index
Independent Keiretsu Loans to Loans to Government Overseas
variable loans listed firms small firms bond ratio branch ratio
Lag 1 of land  .0226 .0220 .0232 .0232
inflation (3.20) (3.12) (3.26) (3.23)
Lag 2 of land  –.0144 –.0134 –.0183 –.0158 –.0158
inflation (–1.91) (–1.79) (–2.44) (–1.99) (–1.99)
Lag 1 of the  –.0176 –.0135 –.0048 –.0540 –.0540
variable (–1.91) (–1.57) (–0.74) (–1.16) (–1.16)
Lag 2 of the –.0612 –.0545 –.0059 –.0189 –.0189
variable (–5.01) (–4.88) (–1.40) (–0.35) (–0.35)
Lag 3 of the –.0548 –.0537 –.0063 –.0333 –.0333
variable (–4.17) (–4.74) (–1.54) (–0.80) (–0.80)
Lag 4 of the  –.0486 –0.0477 –.0114 –.0340 –.0340
variable (–3.66) (–4.35) (–2.52) (–1.00) (–1.00)
R-squared .230 .232 .205 .200 .200
Number of  1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 observations
Note: The dependent variable is the change in the proportion of loans to real estate industry from the
previous year. All the specifications include the first two lags of the inflation rate of land price
(average of all uses for the six largest cities) as independent variables. Each column differs in
the main independent variable, which is specified in the first row of each column. The main 
independent variables are also measured as changes from the previous year. Each regression
includes dummy variables for banks to eliminate the fixed effects. The coefficients on dummy
variables are not reported. The figures in parentheses are t-statistics. Heteroskedasticity-
consistent estimates of standard errors by White (1980) are used to calculate the t-statistics.
The loss of keiretsu loans and loans to listed firms led to a significant increase in real
estate lending. The effect of changes in loans to small firms is insignificant overall.
An increase in government bondholdings also tended to reduce the growth of real
estate lending, but the effect is not statistically significant. The growth of overseas
branches was accompanied by a subsequent increase in loans to real estate developers,
but the effect is not statistically significant.
The estimated coefficients on land price inflation are consistent with what we
would expect. The coefficient on the first lag is positive and significant, suggesting
that higher land price inflation leads to higher growth of real estate lending. The
coefficient on the second lag is negative, but smaller than the coefficient on the first
lag in its magnitude, and often statistically insignificant. Thus, the growth of real
estate loans by banks in the 1980s was positively influenced by high land inflation.
As Table 8 shows, the use of prefecture-specific land price inflation does not
change the result in any substantial way. The coefficient estimate on the first lag of
land inflation is positive and significant. The coefficient on the second lag is negative,
but smaller in magnitude and statistically insignificant. Thus, when we consider the
cross-sectional variation of land price inflation, we find that banks located in a 
prefecture where land price inflation was higher than elsewhere tended to see higher
growth of real estate lending. Keiretsu loans and loans to listed firms continued to
exhibit an important effect on the growth of real estate lending. The results for 
loans for small firms, the government bond ratio, and the overseas branch ratio are 
basically the same as those in earlier tables.Finally, Table 9 shows the regressions that include both prefecture-level land 
inflation and year dummies. The results are qualitatively the same as those in 
Tables 6 through 8.
In summary, the regression analysis suggests that the loss of existing customers
measured by changes in keiretsu loans or loans to listed firms led to the rapid growth
of real estate lending by Japanese banks. Land price inflation also seems to have 
contributed to the increase of loans to the real estate industry. 
VI. Conclusion
This paper has advanced a hypothesis which explains why Japanese banks got into 
massive trouble in the 1990s. The hypothesis stresses the importance of the slow and
incomplete deregulation of the financial system that started in the late 1970s. The
hypothesis puts less emphasis on the wild swings in land prices. The collapse of land
prices was an important shock initiating the bad-loan problem, but more important
were the effects of partial deregulation that made the Japanese banking sector more
vulnerable to such swings in the land market. Financial deregulation provided large
corporations with serious alternatives to bank financing, and many corporations
started to reduce their dependence on bank loans. The deregulation of savers’ 
options and the scope of financial business that banks were allowed to conduct was
26 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/FEBRUARY 2001
Table 8  Regression Analysis of Real Estate Lending (3): Prefecture Land 
Price Indices
Independent Keiretsu Loans to Loans to Government Overseas
variable loans listed firms small firms bond ratio branch ratio
Lag 1 of land .0070 .0069 .0079 .0080 .0082
inflation (3.00) (2.99) (3.18) (3.24) (3.32)
Lag 2 of land  –.0038 –.0038 –.0038 –.0036 –.0036
inflation (–1.47) (–1.46) (–1.40) (–1.32) (–1.34)
Lag 1 of the  –.0148 –.0109 –.0044 –.0388 .2954
variable (–1.82) (–1.45) (–0.67) (–0.86) (1.45)
Lag 2 of the  –.0522 –.0460 –.0055 –.0013 –.2059
variable (–4.65) (–4.52) (–1.38) (–0.02) (–2.01)
Lag 3 of the  –.0507 –.0500 –.0061 –.0548 –.0535
variable (–4.24) (–4.88) (–1.60) (–1.36) (–0.43)
Lag 4 of the  –.0481 –0.0465 –.0121 –.0141 .3241
variable (–3.87) (–4.54) (–2.90) (–0.41) (1.65)
R-squared .242 .244 .222 .217 .239
Number of  1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 observations
Note: The dependent variable is the change in the proportion of loans to real estate industry from the
previous year. All the specifications include the first two lags of the inflation rate of the land price
(average of all uses) of the prefecture where the bank has its headquarter as independent 
variables. Each column differs in the main independent variable, which is specified in the first
row of each column. The main independent variables are also measured as changes from the
previous year. Each regression includes dummy variables for banks to eliminate the fixed
effects. The coefficients on dummy variables are not reported. The figures in parentheses are 
t-statistics. Heteroskedasticity-consistent estimates of standard errors by White (1980) are 
used to calculate the t-statistics.much slower. As a result, the banks did not reduce their loans and shifted their 
loan portfolios more toward firms that were not well known to banks but had land as
collateral. When land prices collapsed, many of those loans became nonperforming.
Through a series of regression analyses, the paper finds that the hypothesis has a
reasonable explanatory power for the cross-sectional variation of growth in real estate
lending and nonperforming loans. The result has an important implication for the
future of the Japanese banking sector. It implies that even if land prices in Japan
recover, the fundamental problem of the Japanese banking sector will not go away.
The solution must be found in the completion of financial deregulation, which will
allow depositors to migrate out of bank deposits and allow traditional banking 
business to shrink to fit the demand for bank loans by corporations. The incomplete
27
What Happened to Japanese Banks?
Table 9  Regression Analysis of Real Estate Lending (4): Prefecture Land Price
Indices and Year Dummies
Independent Keiretsu Loans to Loans to Government Overseas
variable loans listed firms small firms bond ratio branch ratio
Lag 1 of land  .0080 .0079 .0090 .0090 .0095
inflation (3.45) (3.43) (3.76) (3.78) (3.95)
Lag 2 of land  –.0019 –.0020 –.0017 –.0016 –.0013
inflation (–0.82) (–0.83) (–0.68) (–0.66) (–0.52)
1984 dummy –.0033 –.0034 –.0028 –.0035 –.0029
(–3.46) (–3.52) (–2.87) (–3.30) (–2.95)
1985 dummy –.0019 –.0020 –.0013 –.0016 –.0013
(–1.67) (–1.74) (–1.19) (–1.38) (–1.21)
1986 dummy .0014 .0013 .0025 .0021 .0026
(1.18) (1.05) (2.08) (1.65) (2.18)
1987 dummy .0034 .0033 .0042 .0039 .0044
(2.91) (2.83) (3.60) (3.16) (3.78)
1988 dummy –.0005 –.0006 –.0002 –.0005 –.00003
(–0.41) (–0.52) (–0.20) (–0.46) (–0.02)
1989 dummy .0009 .0009 .0011 .0007 .0011
(0.76) (0.73) (0.90) (0.58) (0.93)
Lag 1 of the  –.0166 –.0131 –.0032 –.0235 .2975
variable (–2.05) (–1.73) (–0.51) (–0.53) (1.48)
Lag 2 of the  –.0526 –.0474 –.0067 –.00003 –.1490
variable (–5.06) (–4.98) (–1.54) (–0.0005) (–1.54)
Lag 3 of the  –.0440 –.0436 –.0055 –.0436 .0257
variable (–3.71) (–4.26) (–1.48) (–0.98) (0.21)
Lag 4 of the  –.0354 –0.0360 –.0099 –.0365 .4010
variable (–2.78) (–3.39) (–2.63) (–1.07) (2.02)
R-squared .274 .276 .259 .255 .278
Number of 
observations 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050
Note: The dependent variable is the change in the proportion of loans to real estate industry from the
previous year. All the specifications include the first two lags of the inflation rate of the land 
price (average of all uses) of the prefecture where the bank has its headquarter as independent
variables. Six year dummies are also included in all the specifications. Each column differs in 
the main independent variable, which is specified in the first row of each column. The main 
independent variables are also measured as changes from the previous year. Each regression
includes dummy variables for banks to eliminate the fixed effects. The coefficients on dummy
variables are not reported. The figures in parentheses are t-statistics. Heteroskedasticity-
consistent estimates of standard errors by White (1980) are used to calculate the t-statistics.deregulation in the 1980s created “over-banking” that eventually led to the crisis in
the Japanese banking. The Big Bang deregulation completes the long process of
deregulation in the Japanese financial system. When the effects of the Big Bang are
all played out, the Japanese banking sector will be smaller.
16 The banks that survive
the transition will be much healthier and profitable than they really were in the
“golden decade” of the 1980s.
28 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/FEBRUARY 2001
16. Hoshi and Kashyap (1999) provide a simple calculation of how much the traditional banking business must
shrink in Japan. They estimate shrinkage of 20 to 40 percent. If the banks successfully expand into the financial
business that they did not (or could not) handle in the past, the total assets in the banking sector may not shrink
even when the traditional banking business shrinks. There is no guarantee, however, that Japanese banks can
dominate the competition with other financial institutions and foreign banks outside traditional banking.Aoki, Masahiko, and Hugh Patrick, The Japanese Main Bank System: Its Relevance for Developing and
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